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Abstract:
As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing and
its crime control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new focal point
of concern. But satisfaction with ordinary police practices hides deep problems.
The time is therefore ripe for rethinking the assumptions that have guided
American police for most of the past two decades. This essay proposes an
empirically grounded shift to what we call a procedural justice model of policing.
When law enforcement moves toward this approach, it can be more effective, at
lower cost and without the negative side effects that currently hamper responses
to terrorism and conventional crime. This essay describes the procedural justice
model, explains its theoretical and empirical foundations, and discusses its policy
implications, both for ordinary policing and for efforts to combat international
terrorism.
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American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative

As victimization rates have fallen, public preoccupation with policing and
its crime control impact has receded. Terrorism has become the new focal point
of public concern. But the apparent satisfaction with ordinary police practices
hides deep problems.
Public order successes have been achieved at great cost to politically
powerless communities. As the controversy surrounding the recent arrest of
Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates illustrated,1 our laws and the way they are
enforced have resulted in public attitudes sharply polarized along racial lines,2 a
division that is scarcely surprising in a nation marked by conspicuous racial
disparities in its prison populations.3 And the costs of current strategic choices are
no longer confined to minorities and the poor. Through its criminogenic impact,
imprisonment has cross-cutting effects for the wider population, promising safety
through deterrence at the same time that it increases victimization at the hands of
former inmates.4 And these costs are compounded by fiscal consequences that are

1

Gates was arrested at his Cambridge home, by police officer who suspected him of house-breaking.
Though circumstances were disputed, many whites assumed the officer would not have acted without good
reason, while others (especially blacks) found it unlikely that a middle-aged professor, standing on the porch
of his own home, would have been viewed with suspicion and then arrested— if he had been white. See
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 16-21 (July 2010)
[hereinafter CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE] For the officer’s account, see Cambridge Police Dep’t,
Incident
Report
#
9005127,
July
16,
2009,
available
at
http://www.samefacts.com/archives/Police%20report%20on%20Gates%20arrest.PDF. For Gates’ view, see
Dayo Olopade, Skip Gates Speaks, THE ROOT (July 21, 2009) http://www.theroot.com/views/skip-gatesspeaks?page=0,1.
2

In one careful survey, less than twenty percent of African-Americans considered the American legal system
fair. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of
Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1247 (2000). After President Obama criticized
the officer’s actions, a poll found that twice as many whites as blacks disapproved of the President’s
comments. See Pew Research Ctr., Obama’s Ratings Slide Across the Board, July 30, 2009, available at
http://people-press.org/report/532/obamas-ratings-slide. Similar findings recur throughout the literature.

3

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION
(2010); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (rev. ed. 2006).

IN AN

AGE

OF

COLORBLINDNESS

4

See, e.g., Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520, 2009 WL 2430820 at *84 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4,
2009) (“[T]he state's continued failure to address the severe crowding in California's prisons would
perpetuate a criminogenic prison system that itself threatens public safety.”). For empirical evidence, see
Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City
Neighborhoods, 30 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1551 (2003).
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now impossible to ignore. In California, reliance on long-term imprisonment as a
crime-control strategy has choked off funds for education and pushed the state to
the brink of insolvency.5 Budget imperatives are forcing the state to reduce its
prison population by 6500 inmates, even in the face of a recidivism rate of 70%,
the highest in the nation. One prisoner brought home the dilemma and triggered
widespread alarm when he was released early but then promptly re-arrested for
attempted rape.6 In other places incarceration policies generate fiscal burdens that,
if less dire, are nonetheless patently unsustainable.7 Highly stretched police forces
from New York City to Tulsa, Oakland, Los Angeles and elsewhere are facing
cuts in personnel, even in their high priority units.8
The pressures have become especially acute because we can no longer
subordinate conventional law enforcement to the newer preoccupation with
terrorism. That domain was long seen as far removed from everyday policing.
But government measures in this once-distant arena increasingly intersect with
local efforts to control ordinary crime.9 And as we discuss below, the local

5

See, e.g., Wyatt Buchanan, Has the Golden State Gone Bust?, S.F. GATE, Feb. 22, 2010, available at
http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-02-22/news/17950763_1_bankruptcy-treasurer-bill-lockyer-golden-state;
Larry Gordon, Gale Holland & Mitchell Landsberg, California’s Higher Education System Could Face
Decline, L.A. TIMES, July 31, 2009, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/31/local/me-collegecuts31.

6

Randal C. Archibald, Driven to the Financial Brink, A State Opens the Prison Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2010, at A14.
7

See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, As States Wrestle with Budget Cuts and Crowded Prisons, Many Reevaluate
Their Criminal Justice Codes, L. A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at A20 (discussing states where cost constraints
have forced prison releases; Kentucky granted early release to 3000 inmates).
8

See, e.g., Joel Rubin, Budget Cuts Prompted LAPD To Close a Counter-Terrorism Unit, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
2010; Maya Rao, Layoffs Spreading Among N.J. Public-Sector Workers, PHILA. ENQUIRER, April 13, 2010, at
B04 (describing police force cuts in New Jersey); Nicole Marshall, TPD Making Fewer Arrests, TULSA
WORLD, Mar. 28, 2010, at A1 (describing layoffs of 124 Tulsa police officers); Bobby White, Cuts to Police
Force Test a Safer Oakland, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2009, at A4 (describing decision to lay off 20% of
Oakland police force; similar cuts throughout California and other states). Cf. David W. Chen & Javier C.
Hernandez, Putting Blame on Albany, Mayor Unveils Budget with Heavy Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at
A22 (describing budget-driven plan to cut 892 police officers, later reversed – at expense of teachers and
other city employees - after failed Times Square bombing plot); “Thanks Faisal! Inept Terror Thug Saves
900 Cop Jobs!”, N.Y. POST, May 6, 2010, at 1 (same).
9

See, e.g., TO PROTECT AND SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (David Weisburd et al. 2009); Matthew
C. Waxman, Police and National Security: American Local Law Enforcement and Counter-terrorism After
9/11, 3 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 377 (2009). For detailed discussion, see pp. xxx – xxx, infra.
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policing practices currently favored in much of America are often in direct
conflict with sound responses to the threat of terrorism.
The time is ripe, therefore, for rethinking the assumptions that have guided
American police for most of the past two decades. Zero-tolerance policies, the
order-maintenance model and their various cousins, for all their apparent success,
must be reoriented to make room for different priorities. We see no need for a
radical restructuring of the police function, but what we propose is nonetheless a
significant shift in emphasis, a shift to what we call a procedural justice model of
policing.
The procedural justice approach is grounded in empirical research
demonstrating that compliance with the law and willingness to cooperate with
enforcement efforts are primarily shaped not by the threat of force or the fear of
consequences, but rather by the strength of citizens’ belief that law enforcement
agencies are legitimate. And that belief in turn is shaped by the extent to which
police behavior displays the attributes of procedural justice — practices,
described in more detail below, which generate confidence that policies are
formulated and applied fairly, so that – regardless of material outcomes – people
believe they are treated respectfully and without discrimination. When policing
approaches the procedural justice model, law enforcement can be even more
effective, at lower cost and without the negative side effects that currently hamper
our responses to international terrorism. Indeed, the procedural justice model has
direct relevance for the development of successful strategies within that domain
itself.
In Part I of this essay, we situate the procedural justice approach by
reviewing the principles that inform the police function and the ways they have
changed over recent decades. Part II describes the procedural justice model and
explains its theoretical and empirical foundations. Part III focuses on concrete
policy implications for ordinary policing and for efforts to combat international
terrorism. Part IV offers concluding thoughts.

I. Changing Conceptions of the Police Function

5
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A. Goals and Principles
From its beginnings in the early 1800s and for more than a century
thereafter, urban police in America were a highly decentralized, politically
attuned branch of municipal government, charged not only with preserving order
but also with relaying citizen requests for city services and delivering benefits to
constituents at the precinct and ward levels.10 As American cities mushroomed in
size and density and as local political machines flourished, the police, deeply
engaged in collecting and distributing patronage, occasionally brutal and often
corrupt, became an indispensable arm of the ruling establishment.11 The title of
one scholarly study summed it up: Police: Streetcorner Politicians.12 The
dilemma of “law enforcement in a democratic society”13 – the need not only to
endow officials with authority to deploy deadly force but also to preserve
democratic control – precipitated what was widely seen as a “crisis of
legitimacy.”
The solution that began to emerge in the 1950s, prominently endorsed by
the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice in 1967, was professionalization.14 Henceforth police were to be organized
and managed as a highly trained civil service devoted to crime control, “insular,
homogeneous, and largely autonomous,” with guarantees of independence from
politics, and “purposely distanced” from the communities they were assigned to
protect.15 Legitimacy came to be identified with professional norms, a military
style of leadership, and a detached, reactive mode in which officers responded
10

See Eric Monkkonen, History of Urban Police, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 549 (1992).

11

See JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, CITY POLICE (1973); M. Craig Brown & Barbara D. Warner, Immigrants,
Urban Politics, and Policing in 1900, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 293 (1992).

12

WILLIAM KER MUIR, JR. POLICE: STREETCORNER POLITICIANS (1977). Muir describes this phenomenon
without endorsing it.

13

JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966).

14

President’s Comm’n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society (1967).

15

DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 6 (2008).
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when called for help but deliberately kept their distance from individuals in the
local community.
The professional model bolstered one sort of democratic legitimacy
(political independence) but undermined another – the authority grounded in the
needs and preferences of the polity itself. Just at a time when broad grass-roots
authenticity was becoming the hallmark of democracy,16 police were reaching for
an elite mantle of detached expertise.17 Once again, their legitimacy suffered.
Two adjustments were brought to bear. One was substantive, the due
process model through which the Warren and Burger Courts reaffirmed
constraints on law enforcement power and insisted that they be enforced not only
by the police bureaucracy but also by an independent judiciary.18
The other adjustment was strategic. Emphasizing concepts like
“community policing” or “problem-oriented policing,” law enforcement priorities
were recalibrated. Police effort henceforth would be guided (or would claim to be
guided) by the expressed preferences of “the community,” as revealed in listening
sessions at the grass-roots and meetings with acknowledged or self-proclaimed
community leaders.19
Related, but with significantly different emphasis, “order-maintenance
policing” made it a priority for police to address local problems, even those that
did not rise to the level of grave crimes.20 Its widely accepted watchword was that

16

See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1756- 62 (2005) [hereinafter
Sklansky, Police and Democracy] (describing turn to participatory democracy in 1960s and 1970s).

17

See Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-solving and Community Policing, in MODERN POLICING 99, 117
(Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) (noting that police became “cut off from the aspirations, desires,
and concerns of citizens”).

18

See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) (379-411) (summarizing
case law); cf. Sklansky, Police and Democracy, supra note--, at 1749 (noting criticism of Warren Court
precedents as “symbolism” in the cause of “the legitimacy of the criminal justice system”).
19

See generally Moore, supra note 17; Jerome Skolnick & David Bayley, Theme and Variation in
Community Policing, 10 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1988).

20

GEORGE KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING
CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996).
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“‘[b]roken windows’ do need to be repaired quickly.”21 Unlike many versions of
community-oriented

policing,

however,

the

order-maintenance

approach

sometimes assigned to the police themselves the responsibility for identifying
disorder. One variant of this approach went a step further, from maintaining order
to eliminating all forms of disorder. Its message was zero tolerance: even minor
misconduct was to be systematically suppressed. Legitimacy would come not
from participatory democracy but from effectiveness: police authority would be
accepted and respected because it would achieve results.
Thus, for more than half a century, achieving and maintaining
“legitimacy” has been a central preoccupation both for those who support law
enforcement and for those who want to constrain it. But legitimacy has been
understood in sharply different terms, alternatively constitutional (compliance
with the rule of law), political (governance in conformity with community
preferences) or instrumental (success in reducing crime). The politically charged
disagreements have produced profound transformations, but one thing largely
missing from the debates has been any effort to define precisely what
“legitimacy” means or to measure it empirically. Instead, an apparent consensus
about the importance of police legitimacy has masked radically different
assumptions about what that is and how it can be achieved.
Conceptual ambiguity and empirical ignorance on issues of broad policing
strategy are mirrored in conclusory debates about appropriate tactics for
individual officers on the street. The debates, roughly speaking, center around
competing preferences for being tough or being fair.

B. Tactical Choices: Toughness versus Fairness
Tough cops aren’t automatically unfair, and civil libertarians aren’t
automatically soft, but being tough and being fair are often seen as in tension.
And the perceived need to choose between them arises almost everywhere in
policing and in criminal law generally: street stops, surveillance, Miranda, and so
21

WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER
NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990).

AND

DECLINE: CRIME

AND THE

SPIRAL

OF

DECAY

IN

AMERICAN
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on. In each instance some people feel sure that social protection requires police
powers unconstrained by procedural niceties, and others are equally convinced
that

harsh

measures,

if

insensitive

to

individual

rights,

will

prove

counterproductive.
A similar argument arises in areas far outside of criminal justice. During
the Vietnam War, the issue was framed as a debate about whether we should burn
down villages sympathetic to the Viet Cong or focus instead on winning hearts
and minds. The same dilemma is now one of our military’s biggest
preoccupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A commentator who admires former
President Bush recently said that we must “project global power and military
might [or else our] hegemony will be challenged.”22 A recent op-ed in the New
York Times derided our focus on hearts and minds in Afghanistan; the author
argued that it was more important to kill Taliban than to worry about civilian
casualties.23 General Charles Krulak, a former commandant of the Marine Corps,
takes exactly the opposite view. He claims that we have to use power sparingly
because “the fundamental precept of counterinsurgency” is to “undermine the
enemy’s legitimacy while building our own.”24
Many Americans have little doubt that in each of these areas the tough
approach, whatever its moral drawbacks, at least will make them safer. Another
group feels equally sure that being tough can be counterproductive. The impact of
toughness on effectiveness may be the most fundamental question in the whole
field of social conflict and social control. Though the question is undeniably
empirical, it is rarely treated as such; across the political spectrum, nearly
everyone assumes that it can be answered on the basis of confident intuitions
about the essence of human nature.
For police officers, toughness has not always been preferred. In the early
days of modern urban policing, Sir Robert Peel stressed that “[t]he police must
22

Nile Gardiner, George W. Bush: Winning the War on Terror, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 26, 2008.

23

Lara M. Dadkhah, Empty Skies over Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at A27.

24

Charles C. Krulack & Joseph P. Hoar, Fear Was No Excuse To Condone Torture, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 11,
2009.
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secure the willing cooperation of the public” and that “[p]olice should use
physical force . . . only when the exercise of persuasion, advice, and warning is
insufficient.”25 Yet in more recent times, a preference for toughness has long held
unquestioned sway. Indeed toughness has often been defended as beneficial for
everyone. Police scholar William Muir described the mind set of those who
believed that “[t]he nastier one’s reputation, the less nasty one has to be.”26
Skolnick and Fyfe concur, adding that “[c]ops and everyone else understand the
reality of this paradox. And whether or not they actually articulate it, cops
develop styles of policing in response to it.”27 Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note
that the tough style is not always successful.
The instinctive preference of the cop on the beat for the tough approach to
policing style was potentially in tension with the notion that police agencies
should be “problem-oriented” or “community based.” But that tension dissolved
with the emergence of the “order maintenance” approach, with its emphasis on
aggressive street stops, along with “proactive enforcement of misdemeanor laws
and zero tolerance for minor offenses.”28

Meetings with neighborhood groups

evolved from the orientation required in “community based” models – a
reciprocal problem-solving conversation – into “a bland, one-sided, impersonal
opportunity for city bureaucrats to manufacture consent” for measures they had
already decided to implement.29
Although early assessments suggested that the order-maintenance
approach was “working” (i.e. reducing crime), more careful analysis made clear

25

Quoted in JOHN S. DEMSPEY & LINDA FORST, AN INTRODUCTION TO POLICING 8 (5th ed. 2010).

26

MUIR, supra note 12, at 126.

27

JEROME K. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 95
(1993). Skolnick and Fyfe are quick to note, however, that the tough style is not always successful.

28

BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION
(2001).

OF

ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE

OF

BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 2

29

William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety, 25 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRAT. & MGMT
530, 534 (2002) (describing Seattle experience); WESLEY SKOGAN & S. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING,
CHICAGO STYLE 120 (1997) (describing Chicago experience).
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that aggressive street-level enforcement did not make cities safer.30 Similarly, the
research does not support the widely held belief that police are always safer if
they seek to dominate the situation by force31; when police react to perceived
threats by displaying force, their actions often escalate the conflict.
How could it be that energetic policing, with a high volume of street stops,
searches and arrests was not helping to reduce crime or protect officer safety?
One place to look for a possible answer is the tradition that sees the legitimacy of
official authority not through the lens of constitutional law, politics or economic
efficiency, but rather from the perspective of social psychology.

C. Legitimacy as a Psychological Attribute
The psychological model of legitimacy posits that people obey the law,
irrespective of expected rewards and penalties, when they view the government as
worthy of trust and respect. The theoretical foundation is in the work of Max
Weber, who argued that legitimacy in this psychological sense was the key to the
effectiveness of the State.32 People must believe “that some decision . . . is
entitled to be obeyed by virtue of who made the decision or how the decision was
made.”33
In the context of criminal justice, a large body of research confirms the
links between perceived legitimacy and willingness to obey the law. To be sure,
potential criminals are sometimes influenced by straightforward material
incentives. People who steal cars or rob banks often take into account the chances
of getting caught. There is much evidence that they can be influenced to commit

30

See Harcourt, supra note 28, at 6-11, 59-121. See also Hubert Williams & Anthony M. Pate, Returning to
First Principles: Reducing the Fear of Crime in Newark, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 53, 67 (1987) (ordermaintenance policies in Newark failed to achieve their goals).
31
JOHN D. MCCLUSKEY, POLICE REQUESTS FOR COMPLIANCE: COERCIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE TACTICS
(2003).
32

MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78 (H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills eds., 1946).

33

Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375, 377
(2005).
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their crimes at different times or places. And sometimes potential sanctions
induce them to commit the offenses less frequently or not at all.34
But research also finds strong support for the psychological legitimacy
model. In many situations, people obey the law not because of fear of getting
caught but simply because they view the legal authorities as legitimate and
believe that legitimate authorities should be obeyed.35 Perceived legitimacy is
assessed through a “trust and confidence” index, which asks people to express
their degree of faith in various public institutions, as measured by their belief that
officials are trustworthy, concerned about the welfare of those with whom they
deal, able to protect citizens against crime, and otherwise doing their jobs well.
People who express a high degree of confidence in public authorities comply with
the law either because of social influence (they want to avoid the disapproval of
their social group) or because of internalized moral norms (they want to see
themselves as decent people who do the right thing).36 Legitimacy thus enables
authorities to maintain social order almost automatically, without incurring the
heavy costs required by instrumental strategies relying on arrest, adjudication and
incarceration.37
How can the police build this valuable attribute? The empirical research
finds that this sort of legitimacy is sustained not by an aggressive style that
subordinates individual rights but rather by something closer to its opposite –
practices that can be grouped under the heading of procedural justice.

II. The Procedural Justice Model
34
See Daniel Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twentieth Century, 23 CRIME & JUST.
1 (1998) (collecting studies).
35

See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
OBEY].

THE

LAW (rev. ed. 2006) 59 [hereinafter TYLER, WHY PEOPLE

36

See id. (using survey data to determine influence of different factors upon compliance);Error! Bookmark
not defined. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468 (1997)
(summarizing this research).
37

See Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 307, 379-80 (2009) [hereinafter Tyler, Legitimacy] (reviewing literature to this effect).
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The procedural justice concept captures the perceived fairness of the
process used to make and apply rules, and the quality of the personal treatment
people receive from authorities.38 Fairness in decision making involves such
matters as whether police are viewed as unbiased and consistent, and whether
they give people opportunities to be heard before they take action. Fairness of
treatment involves such matters as whether police are courteous and respectful of
people and their rights.
Conventional wisdom posits that the primary issue for people dealing with
legal authorities is the outcome of the interaction. It is assumed, for example, that
when a driver receives a traffic ticket, he is likely to be upset, but that if the
encounter ends without issuance of a ticket, the driver is more likely to be happy.
But empirical research tells a different story. An extensive body of data
demonstrates that while people are happier when they do not receive an
unfavorable result (such as a traffic ticket), the principal factor shaping their
reactions is whether law enforcement officials exercise authority in ways
perceived to be fair.39 And this is true for both those who do and those who do
not receive the unfavorable result. These findings have been replicated using a
wide array of methodologies (field research, panel studies, experimental studies)
in “dozens of social and organizational contexts.”40

38

See TOM R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 36-43 (2007); J.A. Colquitt et
al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice, 86 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 425 (2001).
39

See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW (2002); Kimberly Belvedere, John L. Worrall
& Stephen G. Tibbetts, Explaining Suspect Resistance in Police-Citizen Encounters, 30 CRIM. J. REV. 30
(2005); Ben Bradford, Jonathan Jackson & Elizabeth A. Stanko, Contact and Confidence: Revisiting the
Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, in POLICING AND SOCIETY 19, 20-46 (2009); Jacinta M. Gau &
Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s
Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 JUSTICE Q. 255 (2010) ; Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy and
Informal Contact, 24 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCH. 10 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy,
and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 431 (2003); Stephen D. Mastrofski, Jeffrey B. Snipes &
Anne E. Supina, Compliance on Demand: The Public's Responses to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. CRIME &
DELINQ. 269 (1996); Michael D. Reisig & Meghan Stroshine Chandek, The Effects of Expectancy
Disconfirmation on Outcome Satisfaction in Police-Citizen Encounters, 24 POLICING INT’L J. POLICE STRAT.
& MGMT. 88 (2001).
40
Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1
ANN, REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 174 (2005).
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The implications of this research for policing tactics are obvious but
seldom appreciated. When police ramp up their arrest rates for low-level offenses
like vandalism and vagrancy, the broken windows hypothesis suggests that
neighborhood residents should be pleased by these efforts to combat disorder.41
But opinion surveys often confound that expectation, finding that where arrest
rates for these offenses rise or where other “crack-down” tactics are implemented,
approval of the police has declined.42 In light of the research we have canvassed,
these results are not mysterious: toughness, if implemented without fairness, is
likely to arouse resentment rather than appreciation.
By contrast, toughness with fairness can be productive. In a study that
interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and following a personal experience with
the police, people who received a negative outcome from an officer who treated
them fairly tended to view the police as more legitimate and were significantly
more willing to cooperate with the police than they had been before that
encounter.43 As a result, the police can take actions to control crime and build
legitimacy at the same time.
The assumption that there is a zero-sum trade-off between individual
rights and public safety is therefore far too simple. When perceptions of
procedural justice and legitimacy decline, people’s willingness to obey also
declines, but when authorities build their legitimacy, then people are more willing
to comply with the law.44 And importantly, procedural fairness matters in similar

41
See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 301-10 (1996) (emphasizing “the sector of the
black law-abiding population that desires more rather than less prosecution and punishment for all types of
criminals”); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153, 1169-70 (1998) (same).
42

Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225; WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 15, 118 (1990).

43
Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime
in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM L. 231, 261 (2008).
44

See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public
Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC. REV. 555 (2003). Some suggest that this line of argument glosses over a
causal ambiguity: Citizens’ perceptions of procedural fairness may be “colored by [their] views about the
legitimacy of the police or courts.” David J. Smith, The Foundations of Legitimacy, in LEGITIMACY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 29, 32-33 (T. Tyler et al. eds. 2007). If so, perceived
legitimacy may shape perceptions of procedural fairness, rather than the other way around. The legitimacy
research has used a variety of strategies to exclude this possibility. See, e.g., Tyler & Fagan, supra n. 43, at
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ways for White, African-American, and Hispanic respondents, with only minor
variations reflecting differences in the issues that are most salient to different
ethnic groups.45
Few would argue that compliance can never be achieved in the absence of
procedural justice. Obedience can still be obtained, but only through intensive
enforcement and harsh punishment. And that route – the one America has largely
followed since the 1960s – is not only expensive from the start, but it can trigger
a downward spiral.

Harsh repression enhances material incentives for

compliance, but it weakens perceptions of fairness and thus the willingness to
comply voluntarily. And that effect requires yet another increase in the use of
aggressive enforcement measures, a step which in turn weakens voluntary
compliance even more.
Most of the research testing the legitimacy model has focused on
willingness to violate the law.

But recent research also examines the links

between procedural justice, legitimacy and police capacity to secure cooperation
from the general public.46
When police are combating crime and disorder, they need the help of the
community.47 People who discover a criminal in hiding have to decide whether to
report him. When a crime is occurring, they have to make a similar decision.
They may also be asked to attend community meetings to discuss policing
strategies or to participate in activities such as neighborhood watch. In all these
cases police success in fighting crime depends upon public cooperation. And
cooperation is a more fragile commodity than compliance, because it is easy for

251 (using panel data to measure judgments of legitimacy and procedural justice before and after encounters
with the police).
45

See RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM
(2006); Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the
Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322 (2005).
46

See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in
Counter-Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & SOC. REV. 405 (2010); Tyler & Fagan,
supra note 43; Lyons, supra note 29.

47
See Robert J. Sampson, S. W. Raudenbush & F. Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel
Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
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people not to cooperate: When does a mere bystander face penalties for not
reporting a crime or for not attending a community meeting? People must want to
cooperate with the police.
Yet in many low-income African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods,
anti-snitching campaigns and other signs of mistrust make clear that even where
citizens are law-abiding and desperate to have safe neighborhoods, their
cooperation with the police cannot be taken for granted.48
The research on cooperation finds that willingness to assist the police – for
example, by reporting suspicious behavior or by participating in crime prevention
programs – is strongly linked to people’s belief that police authority is legitimate.
And that belief is strong only when officials exercise their authority fairly.
Conversely, when perceptions of procedural justice and legitimacy decline,
willingness to cooperate also declines.49 In one study, procedural fairness was
more than twice as important for securing cooperation as judgments about police
competence or the fairness of outcomes.50
In short, an emphasis on fairness appears to be central to police success in
maintaining social order. Even though tough enforcement measures seem to
increase an offender’s probability of apprehension and conviction, the net effect
of tough measures can be the opposite, and not only because toughness tends to
chill voluntary compliance. Toughness also chills cooperation from the lawabiding community. That reduced cooperation in turn decreases the probabilities
of apprehension and conviction, and those effects in turn decrease even the
involuntary compliance achieved through the threat of sanctions.

III. Policy Implications of the Procedural Justice Model

48

Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and Response, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1193 (2008).
49
See Lyons, supra note 29, at 536, 538 (profiling and other tactics resented in minority communities “make
it more difficult for citizens in those communities with the information we seek to communicate [it]
effectively . . . . Effective partnerships . . . only produce the desired forms of cooperation when they operate
as a mechanism to increase understanding, trust and respect among the parties . . . .”)
50

See Tyler, Legitimacy, supra note 37, at 379-80 (comparing influence of perceived legitimacy and police
effectiveness on willingness to cooperate).
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In this Part, we discuss the implications of the procedural justice research
for concrete policy measures in two areas of conventional policing – control of
ordinary crime and control of misconduct by the police themselves. We then turn
to its implications for domestic counter-terrorism policing.

A. Controlling Ordinary Crime
The zero-tolerance and order-maintenance models of policing, along with
other instrumental approaches, emphasize efforts to control crime by increasing
the density of police on the street and the frequency of street stops. For example,
a Chicago initiative aimed at containing misbehavior by unruly youth and gang
members led police over a three-year period to order over 89,000 individuals to
disperse and resulted in the arrest of over 42,000 people on charges of “gang
loitering.”51 From 2003 to 2007, the number of street stops in New York City
rose 500%, even though the crime rate was stable.52 And these stops were
disproportionally concentrated among minority group members.53 Data from other
jurisdictions show similar patterns.54
The procedural justice research described above suggests, however, that
these efforts can be counterproductive.

To the extent that stop-and-search

practices and frequent arrests for low-level public-order offenses are seen as harsh
or racially selective, as they apparently are in many urban communities,55 these
practices tend to impede compliance and voluntary cooperation with law
enforcement. “[I]ntensive frisks and needless arrests can often be a source of

51

City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1999) (plurality opinion).

52

Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda Geller, Garth Davies, and Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken Windows
Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING (S.K. Rice & M.D. White eds. 2009).
53

See Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan and Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in
Light
of
Claims
of
Racial
Bias
(Dec.
2005),
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/frisk7.pdf.

54

In Los Angeles, for example, in 2003-2004 there 4,569 stops per 10,000 African American residents, but
only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white residents. See Ian Ayres & Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially
Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police Department 5-7 (October 2008), http://www.aclusc.org/documents/view/47.
55

See text at note --, supra.
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friction,” thereby “undermining the very sense of legal legitimacy they were
designed to foster.”56
The damage can be especially great when street sweeps and arrests for
“loitering” bear down on youth who are perceived as threats to a well-ordered
community. The views of children and adolescents about law and the courts are
shaped by many factors, including parents, teachers, gangs, the media, and
interactions with the police.57 Because adult orientations toward the law are often
formed during adolescence, these precursors of adult attitudes are crucial. A
considerable literature inspired by the “broken windows” hypothesis has posited
that norms of law-abiding behavior can be nurtured by a strong law enforcement
presence that exerts control over public spaces, stigmatizes gang membership and
drives disorderly youth off the streets.58 Yet the empirical research canvassed here
suggests the opposite – that intensive law enforcement and a readiness to arrest
for low-level offenses is far more likely to arouse resentment, weaken police
legitimacy and undermine voluntary compliance with the law.59
Tactics that emphasize procedural justice can be equally effective, with
fewer negative side effects. In the procedural justice model, officers are not
oriented toward addressing situations primarily with the threat of force. Instead
officers would be trained to view every citizen contact as an opportunity to build
legitimacy through the tone and quality of the interaction, with force a last resort.
Although police leaders long paid lip service to the importance of gaining
community trust, concrete steps to further this goal were either nonexistent or (as

56

R. Collins, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created a New Crime in Baltimore, 14
GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419, 426 (2007). See also Delgado, supra note 48, at 1202; Babe K. Howell,
Broken Lives from Broken Windows: the Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009).
57

Jeffrey Fagan & A. R. Piquero, Rational Choice and Developmental Influences on Recidivism Among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 715 (2007).

58

See, e.g., MARTIN S. JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND AMERICAN URBAN SOCIETY 193-202
(1991); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Spaces, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
551, 640-42 (1997).

59

See p. – supra; Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 SOC. J.
RES. 217 (2005). See also Tracy Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African-American Men, 92
MARQ. L. REV. 651 (2009). To be sure, further research is needed to clarify the links between adolescent
experience and adult attitudes toward authority.
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in the community policing movement) centered on discussion forums largely
divorced from the daily activity of the cop on the beat. More recently, police
departments across the country have begun to make more tangible efforts, but
only in discrete programs of limited scope. An innovative Boston initiative
engaged inner-city ministers and other community leaders in an effort to convince
at-risk youth to steer clear of firearms.60 In High Point, North Carolina, police
managed to shut down open-air drug markets by offering dealers a dignified
opportunity to avoid arrest in return for a commitment to abandon the drug
trade.61 A Chicago program has reportedly succeeded in reducing violence and
recidivism by organizing discussion forums in which gun offenders on probation
or parole meet with police officers, neighborhood residents and social workers for
discussions in which their concerns are treated with respect and their needs are
addressed with support instead of only threats of punishment.62 As many as
seventy-five cities reportedly are now implementing legitimacy-inspired
initiatives of this kind.63 Although the value of such programs is now widely
recognized, police departments have yet to fully appreciate their psychological
basis and their relevance to the full range of policing activity.
Obviously, forcible street stops should not be withdrawn from the law
enforcement arsenal. Stops based on objective indications of a serious offense are
almost always warranted, and they need not trigger community mistrust if police
pay attention to what happens during such stops. Indeed the available data suggest
that although African-Americans resent high levels of arrest for public-order

60

See Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring & Anne Morrison Piehl, Problem-Oriented
Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston's Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. CRIME
& DELINQ. 195, 198, 220 (2000).

61

See Mark Schoofs, New Intervention: Novel Police Tactic Puts Drug Markets Out of Business, WALL ST.
J., at A1.
62
See Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe
Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMP. L. STUD. 223, 254 (2007).
63

See Meares, supra note 59, at 665 & n.95. See also MARK KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS (2009)
(discussing strategies to reduce crime with less reliance on arrest and incarceration).
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offenses, their approval of the police is “positively correlated with arrest rates for
more serious offenses.”64
Thus, where stops are carefully initiated, police would not have to reduce
their frequency. But even then, the procedural justice approach emphasizes a need
for change: police departments must focus on altering the dynamics of policecitizen interaction. Instead of seeking to instill fear or project power, officers
would aim to treat citizens courteously, briefly explain the reason for a stop, and
(absent exigent circumstances) give the citizen an opportunity to explain herself
before significant decisions are made.
These elements of

procedurally fair interaction go well beyond

constitutional minimums, which typically focus on limiting what the government
can do. But many requirements of constitutional law and criminal procedure do
limit the way that government power is exercised. Even when officers have
probable cause and a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment normally requires
them to knock, announce their presence, state the basis of their authority, and give
the homeowner an opportunity to admit them peaceably.65 Officers normally must
give the homeowner a copy of the warrant, to provide official confirmation of
their authority and the limits on the permitted scope of the search.66 After the
search, they must deliver an inventory of items seized, to establish a record of
their actions and a readily understood basis for challenging unauthorized
conduct.67 These requirements, so often celebrated in Fourth Amendment
tradition,68 are not about limiting the tangible burdens government may impose;
64

Brooks, supra note 2, at 1225-26.

65
See, e.g., Wilson v. Ark. 514 U.S. 927, 929 (1995) (holding that common law “knock and announce”
requirement forms part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry); Banks v. United States, 540 U.S.
31, 41 (2003) (discussing requirement of “reasonable wait time”); Richards v. Wis., 520 U.S. 385 (1997)
(failure to knock and announce permissible only when officers have reasonable suspicion that doing so would
be dangerous or futile).
66

The obligation to provide a copy of the warrant is typically grounded in statutes or court rules but generally
has not been treated as a Fourth Amendment requirement. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL &
NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §3.4, at 177-78 (3d ed. 2000).
67

City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999) (basing this requirement on Fourteenth Amendment
due process rather than the Fourth Amendment).

68

See, e.g., Wilson, 514 U.S. at 532, 533 (tracing lineage of the knock-and-announce rule back to the 13th
Century and finding that it “was woven quickly into the fabric of early American law”).
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indeed the traditional abhorrence of clandestine searches69 is hard to understand
from a purely material perspective. The point of these requirements is essentially
the same as that which the procedural justice findings stress – the importance of
government’s perceived legitimacy, sustained by actions that build trust and treat
citizens with respect. The Miranda warnings were designed to serve the identical
purpose, communicating to the suspect that officers will treat him with dignity
and acknowledge his rights.70
There is no reason, however, for police conceptions of fair treatment to
stop with the constitutional minimum. In connection with street stops, operational
guidelines within each department could formalize appropriate steps, such as the
need for courteous treatment, the obligation to give the citizen a reason for the
stop and a chance to explain the circumstances. In this spirit, the review
committee established to examine the Gates incident in Cambridge cautioned that
“actions that police take to protect their safety and the safety of others can seem
cold, insensitive, or overly authoritarian. . . . Whatever police can reasonably do
to explain the reasons for the interaction and de-escalate a situation is vital to the
peaceful resolution of the encounter.”71 Such steps could be made a routine part
of every officer’s behavior on the beat. With their low cost and potential for high
crime-control payoff, changes like these are a smart use of limited police
resources.
As a simple way to put such priorities into practice, officers could easily
carry and give to those they stop a card containing a short statement of the rules
that govern police stops. The card would enumerate the rights that must be
respected (including the right to have the reasons for the stop explained and the

69

See, e.g., United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1336 (2d Cir. 1990) (clandestine search permissible
only when secrecy is “essential”); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (when
circumstances justify clandestine search, notice to homeowner must nonetheless be given within seven days;
extensions of this period permissible only on a “strong showing of necessity”).

70

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 460 (1966) (in the absence of warnings, custodial interrogation
“trades on the weaknesses of individuals” and is “destructive of human dignity”; “the constitutional
foundation underlying the privilege [against self-incrimination] is the respect a government – state or federal
– must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.”).
71
See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1, at 27.
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right to tell their side of the story before decisions are made) and the procedures
for complaining about unfair treatment. Such efforts help communicate to the
public that procedural justice principles are taken seriously.
Because trust in the police varies dramatically across racial lines,72
policing methods must be especially attuned to racial sensibilities. Of course that
point in itself is not new. But we can illustrate the need for a new emphasis by
considering the issue of “profiling” and the Gates incident in particular.
Traditionally the study of racial profiling has focused upon whether reliance on
racial markers actually occurs. We might ask, for example, if Officer Crowley
took into account Professor Gates’ African-American appearance or whether the
police generally profile minorities. To do so we would collect statistics on street
stops, adjust them for actual rates of offending in the target population, and
analyze the data to determine if the police stop African-Americans more often
than is justified by objectively based concerns about crime.
Following the argument of this paper, however, the Gates case (and other
minority experiences with the police) would be approached from a different
perspective. People generally view racial profiling as unfair, and when police
action leads people to feel they have been profiled, it prompts hostility.73 This
response was evident when Professor Gates reacted to his perception that his
treatment was explained simply by the fact that he was a “Black man in
America.”74 The belief that the police are using unfair procedures delegitimates
their authority and leads people to resist it.
This finding has two important implications.

First, a person can be

strongly affected by police contact even if nothing legally significant happens.
Even when people are not arrested, they can still feel disrespected, and this will
change their views about the police. As a consequence, experiences need to be
evaluated in terms of their influence upon the person’s views about the police, not
just in terms of whether people were arrested and searched, or why (from the
72

See p. --, supra.
Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl Wakslak, Profiling and the Legitimacy of the Police: Procedural Justice,
Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 13, 13-42 (2004).
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See CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 1.
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officer’s perspective) he decided to act. Even trivial incivilities contribute to a
climate of illegitimacy. The Supreme Court, along with countless other observers,
has repeatedly missed this point.75
Second, people can have a positive experience even when the police take
some potentially unwelcome enforcement action (searching their car or giving
them a ticket). As a result, police can act to control crime and build legitimacy at
the same time. In a study that interviewed New Yorkers both prior to and
following a personal experience with the police, people who received a negative
outcome from an officer who treated them fairly tended to view the police as
more legitimate and were significantly more willing to cooperate with the police
than they had been before that encounter.76 In short, police who treat people
even-handedly and with respect can reinforce their legitimacy even when they act
firmly and aggressively.
Of course, these implications have relevance to much more than just race
relations. The research on legitimacy establishes that America’s policing model
for dealing with people in all communities and of all ethnicities needs to change.

B. Police Misconduct
Attention to legitimacy is important for another sort of compliance –
compliance by police officers themselves.
Nearly all existing models of policing posit that an officer seeking to
prevent crime and disorder wants to exert force (conducting stops, searches and
arrests) and that this desire is held in check by an unwelcome, externally imposed
constraint – the obligation to remain within constitutional boundaries. Professor
Herbert Packer captured this notion and etched it into several generations of

75

See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (upholding authority of vice-squad officers to make
arrest for failure to signal a turn, whether or not their action was pretextual). Compare United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 563 (1976) (“objective intrusion” held “minimal” because of stops’
“public and relatively routine nature,” even though stops were made “on the basis of apparent Mexican
ancestry”) with id. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (positing that the “experience [would be] particularly
vexing for the motorist of Mexican ancestry who is selectively referred, knowing that the officers' target is
the Mexican alien.”).
76

Tyler & Fagan, supra note --, at 261.
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criminal procedure scholarship with his influential paradigm contrasting the
“crime control” and “due process” perspectives.77
In this view, police who disregard search-and-seizure rules may face
penalties (suppression of evidence, civil damages or administrative sanctions),
and such penalties are assumed to encourage compliance through the instrumental
logic of deterrence. The officer considers every stop and every search as
potentially beneficial, but she must weigh those benefits against potential
sanctions. When the officer can foresee that an exclusionary rule applies, the
expected costs will outweigh benefits, misconduct will be deterred and
compliance with constitutional norms will be achieved. Conversely, if an officer
cannot foresee the prospect of an exclusionary sanction, her behavior supposedly
cannot be affected. For the current Supreme Court, this logic has become an
analytic obsession, as a majority of the Justices now approach nearly every issue
concerning the exclusionary rule by examining the details of presumed deterrence
effects under particular circumstances.78
From a legitimacy perspective, assessments of this sort (whatever their
conclusions) are profoundly misguided. The empirical research makes clear that
fear of sanctions by itself generates only weak, poorly motivating incentives,
which in turn produce at best a sullen, resentful, imperfect form of compliance.
And this is exactly what we often observe in the case of police officers asked to
comply with the rules of search and seizure. Indeed, the payoff from instrumental
deterrence in that context is especially poor, just as we would expect, because
those rules and their accompanying sanctions enjoy little legitimacy in the eyes of
the police to whom they are addressed. Like the exclusionary rule and for similar
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HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1960).
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See e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (exclusionary rule applies only when
exclusion can “meaningfully deter” police misconduct; Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596-97 (2006)
(same); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (same). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978) (exclusionary rule may not be invoked to suppress fruits of an illegal search that did not violate the
defendant’s personal rights).
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reasons, damage suits and institutional reform litigation have had only mixed
success in changing the culture of police organizations.79
The legitimacy perspective makes clear that seeking to compel change
through suppression remedies, lawsuits and consent decrees can have only limited
effectiveness, because the police then seek ways to avoid detection and
accountability. Just as with achieving compliance by the public, so with the
police, we need to change what they want to do.
The difference between Fourth and Fifth Amendment requirements is
telling here. Police compliance with the rules of search and seizure is always in
doubt; evasion and even outright perjury are sometimes the officer’s preferred
course.80 In contrast, although police interrogators occasionally flout the Miranda
rules or interpret them grudgingly, for the most part they follow Miranda and give
the warnings routinely. The reason is simple: police have learned that they benefit
from compliance, because the Miranda warnings tend to put suspects at ease,
create a (false) sense of security and thereby help officers to get confessions.81
The procedural justice model is promising from this perspective because
the changes in police practices it calls for82 are simple to implement and relatively
inexpensive. More important, they benefit the police themselves, not just outside
citizens and “bad guys.” By projecting sensitivity to procedural justice, officers
build their legitimacy and nurture public support. They thereby gain community
respect, enhance the safety of their working environment, and create conditions
likely elicit greater cooperation in fighting crime. Over time fewer police and
prisons are needed, and resources can be redirected to other social priorities. The

79

See Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 46478 (2004) (cataloguing reasons why individual remedies are ineffective at changing police institutions);
David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 480-88
(1992) (discussing lack of success in judicial efforts to change police culture).
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See, e.g., Myron W. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the
Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 82-83 (1992) (documenting pervasive police perjury used
to avoid exclusionary rule in important cases).
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See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social
Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 516-38 (1996) (reviewing evidence to this effect).
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police are gradually transformed from an occupying force into genuine partners
with all components of the community, minorities and the poor included.
We do not doubt the importance of penalties such as the exclusionary rule
and will have more to say about them in a moment.

But reform of police

organizations must start from inside. Articles that make a seemingly similar point
– for example, urging reliance on internal police guidelines and administrative
sanctions – are too numerous to count, but nearly all proposals of this sort lack an
essential feature: positive motivation. The empirical findings make clear that
police must want to follow such guidelines, whether or not they will be caught
violating them.
Creating positive motivations for compliance is essential not only to insure
respect for citizen’s rights but also to achieve adherence to a broad range of
internal operational standards and norms. A working environment conducive to
those motivations involves several elements. The management literature develops
them in detail,83 and we do not propose to discuss them in depth here. But the key
ingredient is worth emphasizing, though it is obvious from what we have already
said, because the criminal-procedure and organizational-reform literature almost
always assumes that ingredient to be missing and unattainable. The ingredient, of
course, is the legitimacy of the rules in question. And by legitimacy here, we do
not mean a legal or constitutional legitimacy grounded in a duly enacted text.
Rather, as we have stressed throughout, the key concept is social and
psychological legitimacy, from the perspective of the target audience whose
compliance is sought. Officers must come to understand that the requirements of
procedural justice serve their own interest, apart from their constitutional pedigree
and even when (as with many of the fair-treatment dimensions of procedural
justice) they are by no means constitutionally mandated.
Tone from the top. Attaining this sort of legitimacy begins with the “tone
from the top.” Police leaders must emphasize the value of building public support,
helping citizens to feel comfortable and safe rather than threatened by the police
83
See, e.g., V. Lee Hamilton & Joseph Sanders, Responsibility and Risk in Organizational Crimes of
Obedience, 14 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 49 (1992).
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presence. Leaders must communicate that while force will always have a role in
policing, that role should be as a last resort, one that should seldom need to be
used.
Recognition and reward.

Police reward structures also need to be

reshaped, so that building legitimacy in the community is viewed as a goal of
equal importance to issuing traffic tickets and making arrests. If officers believe
that their advancement, compensation, and respect in the eyes of their leadership
are linked to their ability to create legitimacy and motivate cooperation, they are
more likely to follow the principles of procedural fairness in their behavior on the
street.
When considering incentive structures, it is important to think beyond
material rewards.

Studies of work organizations suggest that the impact of

material rewards generally flows through their role in signaling management
respect for employees and their contributions. Employees want to know that their
efforts are valued by their superiors.84 Studies of police organizations indicate
that one of the best ways to communicate respect is to follow the principles of
procedural justice (fair decision-making and fair interpersonal treatment) in
dealing with officers themselves. Officers in the ranks should be afforded a voice
in the formulation of the rules that govern their performance, and they must feel
fairly treated in connection with internal discipline and civilian review board
procedures. Officers who feel respected are more likely to accept departmental
policies as legitimate and to comply with them voluntarily.85
Correspondingly, officers need to believe that their adherence to these
policies will be recognized by their superiors. Being able to reward the police in
this way requires new sorts of data. Routine efforts to follow up on police-citizen
contact can verify compliance with procedural justice principles and reinforce a
procedural justice culture within the police department. Police statisticians must

84
Tom R. Tyler & S.L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee Conduct?: The Antecedents
of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143 (2005).
85

Tom R. Tyler, P. Callahan & J. Frost, Armed and dangerous(?): Can Self-Regulatory Approaches Shape
Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 L. & SOC. REV. 457 (2007).
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move beyond their preoccupation with clearance rates to measure trends in public
confidence in the police and in public evaluations of the fairness of police
practices, both among those who have had personal experiences with the police
and in the community generally.

Such data-collection efforts nurture the

legitimacy of procedural justice norms in the eyes of the cop on the beat while
also signaling to the public that support for these norms is genuine within the
police department itself.
The Exclusionary Rule. If the perceived legitimacy of the rules governing
police behavior is the key to compliance, and if instrumental incentives have little
bite, can we dispense with sanctions like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule? The question is by no means merely academic. A chorus of scholarly
voices has argued that changes in urban politics and in the demography and
professionalism of the police have made obsolete the judicially enforced criminal
procedure restraints developed by the Warren and Burger Courts in response to
police oppression of minorities.86 And the Supreme Court itself seems
increasingly ready to gut the exclusionary rule or abandon it completely.87 There
is much to be said on the other side of this debate,88 but here we focus solely on
the research findings concerning procedural justice and legitimacy.
From its inception, the exclusionary rule has reflected two distinct, though
complementary concerns. One is the desire “to deter – to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way – by removing the

86

E.g., Kahan & Meares, supra note 41, at 1169-70.

87

See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 702 (2009) (rejecting the rule that suppression is
presumptively mandated for all illegally seized evidence and holding that “police conduct must be
sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence
is worth the price paid by the justice system”); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591, 596, 597 (2006)
(exclusionary rule should be applied only where deterrence benefits outweigh its “massive” social costs, and
because “much has changed” since 1961, exclusion is not necessarily justified today simply because that
remedy was held necessary “in different contexts and long ago”).
88
The Fourth Amendment at its inception had nothing whatever to do with preventing racial oppression, and
to the extent that this concern has greater salience today, it is not plausible to suggest that American policing
tactics have rendered it obsolete. In any event, there is no evidence to support (and much evidence to
contradict) the Court’s assumption in Hudson, 547 U.S., at 597-98, that civil damage liability provides all
the deterrence needed. See id., at 609-11 (Breyer, J. dissenting); Herring, 129 S. Ct., at 710 n.6 (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting) (“professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy, not its superfluity”); David Alan
Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567, 579-82 (2008) (same).
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incentive to disregard it.”89 But in adopting the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio,
the Court also stressed that “there is another consideration, the imperative of
judicial integrity.”90
For both Holmes and Brandeis, “judicial integrity” was the decisive point.
As Brandeis put it, exclusion of tainted evidence is essential “to maintain respect
for law [and] preserve the judicial process from contamination.”91 The objective,
he said in one of his best known opinions, is not to tip the balance of an individual
officer’s incentives but to protect the foundations of government itself: “Our
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; . . . it invites anarchy.”92 Justice Brennan urged the
same view, emphasizing that suppression of tainted evidence “assur[es] the
people . . . that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus
minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government.”93
In its latest opinions, the Court acknowledged that this perspective
dominated at the outset, but declared that “we have long since rejected that
approach.”94 Instead, the Court now insists that exclusion is justified solely by
potential deterrence of police misconduct, and it gives that rationale a newly
constrained form. Two conditions must be met: there must be “appreciable”
deterrence and in addition, “to the extent that application of the exclusionary rule
could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighted
against [its] substantial social costs.”95 As a result, exclusion now is “our last
89

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 455 (1961) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).

90

Mapp, 367 U.S., at 659 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S at 222).

91
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting); id. at 469 (Holmes, J.
dissenting) (“[I]t is a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part”).
92

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 483-85 (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
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United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

94
Hudson, 547 U.S., at 591 (acknowledging that “[e]xpansive dicta in Mapp . . . suggested wide scope for the
exclusionary rule.”).
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Herring, 129 S. Ct., at 700-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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resort, not our first impulse.”96

And raising even further this barrier to a

suppression remedy, the Court seems to have set aside the long-standing rule of
exclusion for the fruits of objectively unreasonable police searches and arrests;
instead “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that
such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”97 This new
approach gives the police, and is expressly designed to give the police, much
greater freedom to secure convictions by using illegally seized evidence.
The present Court’s assumption that suppression inflicts substantial costs,
by weakening our ability to impose criminal punishment, is of course the polar
opposite of the Brandeis view that it is the failure to suppress that will breed
lawlessness. As an a priori matter, neither view is intrinsically implausible. But
the empirical research canvassed here has direct relevance for this debate. And
those studies provide compelling support for the Brandeis insight on which the
exclusionary rule originally rested. Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s reasoning
presciently expresses the best current understanding of the connections between
legitimacy, procedural justice and the control of crime.
As we have developed in detail throughout this paper, the research
regularly finds that people comply with the law not primarily because of fear of
sanctions but rather because they believe that authorities who have legitimacy
should be obeyed. And such legitimacy flows from people’s confidence that
officials are trustworthy, that they abide by the law, and that they treat citizens
with respect.98 Official disregard for the law – made evident when misconduct
can be openly exploited to prosecutorial advantage in court – is the kind of
behavior that, the research establishes, tends to weaken perceived legitimacy and
willingness to cooperate with law enforcement.
Opponents of the exclusionary rule sometimes suggest that the notion of
“judicial integrity” argues against suppression of illegally seized evidence.
96

Hudson 547 U.S., at 591.
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Herring129 S. Ct., at 702.
See p. xxx, supra.
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Contrary to Brandeis, they insist that because suppression can allow obviously
guilty defendants to go free, it undermines public confidence in the criminal
justice system.99 The legitimacy research has not tested this sort of claim in the
specific context of the exclusionary rule. But the general question this argument
poses – whether legitimacy is shaped more strongly by police effectiveness than
by procedural justice – has been studied in depth across a wide variety of law
enforcement situations. And the findings are consistent: in virtually every context
studied to date, law enforcement effectiveness has displayed at best only a weak
influence on perceived legitimacy, while procedural justice concerns are strongly
linked to legitimacy, voluntary compliance and willingness to cooperate.100
Against this background, relaxation of the exclusionary rule represents a
direct assault on the capacity of police and the law enforcement system to succeed
in their mission of maintaining social order. To be sure, a prosecutor’s ability to
use illegally seized evidence increases her capacity to secure a conviction and a
long sentence, an unequivocal crime control benefit if viewed strictly in the short
term, But the strong and consistent finding of the relevant research is that the net
effect of law enforcement powers like these is likely to be the opposite, because
judicial tolerance for Fourth Amendment violations will generate disrespect for
authority, chill voluntary compliance and discourage law-abiding citizens from
offering the cooperation that makes it possible to apprehend and convict other
offenders in future cases.
Controlling ordinary crime and controlling police misconduct thus are
closely connected. And if we are to succeed at both, procedural justice concerns
must be placed at the center of attention.

C. Domestic Counterterrorism
Terrorism is generally considered a problem to be distinguished from
ordinary wrongdoing. Like efforts to combat drug trafficking and some forms of
99
See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two
Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466 (1996) (describing this argument).
100

See, e.g., TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY, supra note 35, at 59 (links to compliance); Tyler, Schulhofer & Huq,
supra note 46, at 380 (links to cooperation); Tyler & Fagan, supra note --, at 251 (same).
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organized crime, preventing terrorist attacks requires close attention to
international linkages, and federal enforcement agencies take the lead. Yet
terrorism differs significantly from other sorts of transnational criminality. Its
motivations are usually political rather than financial, its potential for social harm
is vastly greater, and its connections to foreign policy and armed conflict are more
prominent. Partly for those reasons, the structure of law enforcement is
distinctive. Local policing is sometimes relegated to an afterthought; the federal
government is expected to play, and does play, an overwhelmingly dominant role.
In light of these contrasts, the applicability of the procedural justice
approach to counterterrorism can hardly be taken for granted. Yet criminal justice
theory and the dynamics of terrorism both suggest that this model has powerful
relevance. And the empirical research specific to this context, though less
comprehensive than that in the area of ordinary crime, confirms its importance at
all levels, from grand strategy in the federal agencies to the daily behavior of the
cop on the beat.
Start at the place that usually gets the least attention – local policing.
Despite the widespread assumption of federal primacy, law enforcement officials
increasingly recognize that local police must play significant role. Collaboration
has even been channeled through formal institutions such as Joint Terrorism Task
Forces and “fusion centers.”101
In part, the growing involvement of local police flows from perceived
changes to the nature of terrorist challenge. In the aftermath of the September
2001 attacks, the threat was perceived as a largely foreign-source affair. The July
2007 National Intelligence Estimate played down threats of domestic origin and
identified the growing strength of al Qaeda in western Pakistan as the principal danger to
the United States.102 In late 2009 this perception began to change with a series of

allegations concerning terrorism conspiracies developed within the United
101

See Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, & John Rollins, Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers:
Issues and Options for Congress 1-2 (RL34070, July 6, 2007), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf.
102

National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland 3
(July 2007). The National Intelligence Estimate summarizes “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most
authoritative written judgments on national security issues.” Id. at 2.
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States.103 The 2010 National Security Strategy warned that “recent incidences of
violent extremists in the United States” demonstrate “the threat to the United
States and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home.”104 Of 202
people charged with serious terrorist crimes since September 11, 2001, more than
half have been U.S. citizens, and over one-third of those have been Americanborn.105
These new threats give local law enforcement increased prominence, but
its importance is now acknowledged even in connection with dangers emanating
abroad.

A recent RAND Corporation report, drawing from global

counterterrorism experiences, notes that terrorism is largely a policing problem,
not a military matter, because local police are best able to build relationships with
the communities in which terrorists try to hide and recruit members. The report
urges police to “actively encourage and cultivate cooperation by building stronger
ties with community leaders.”106 Another RAND report observes that “state and
local law enforcement agencies … may be uniquely positioned to augment federal
intelligence capabilities by virtue of their presence in nearly every American
community [and] their knowledge of local individuals and groups.”107 These
conclusions are consonant with a broader stream of thought that understands
global terrorism as a form of “insurgency” most easily defeated by winning the
loyalty of the communities in which terrorists may be found.108 Even in foreign
103

These included: the decision of a Somali-American to travel to Somalia and become the first American
suicide bomber; the July 2009 arrest of seven North Carolina Muslims on allegations they intended to commit
suicide attacks; the September 2009 arrest of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi based on allegations that he
intended to attack the New York subway system; the December 2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David
Headley in connection with the 2008 Mumbai attacks; and the May 2010 attempt by Pakistani-born American
citizen Faisal Shahzad to explode a car bomb in New York’s Times Square. See Karen Greenberg,
Homegrown: The Rise of American Jihad, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 10, 2010, at 6.
104

The President of the United States, National Security Strategy 19 (May 2010).
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Greenberg, supra note 103, at 6-7.
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K. JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERROR ix (2005); accord Gary
LaFree & James Hendrickson, Building a Criminal Justice Policy for Terrorism, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
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theaters of military operation, heavy firepower, though still favored by some,109 is
increasingly de-emphasized in favor of at least partial reliance upon measures
akin to domestic policing.110
Local police thus play a crucial role, by virtue of their familiarity with
neighborhoods and their ability to elicit information held within domestic
communities. And with counterterrorism as with policing against conventional
crime, community cooperation is essential if the police are to perform this role
successfully. Moreover, as with traditional policing, cooperation cannot be taken
for granted. Indeed, cooperation may be even more fragile in the context of
counterterrorism than in ordinary law enforcement: Law-abiding members of the
relevant community, though unswervingly loyal to the United States, know that
cooperation could mean exposing people with whom they share close ethnic and
religious ties to unusually harsh procedures and sanctions. Shaping sound policy
to navigate these sensibilities is thus vitally important but exceptionally delicate.
Law enforcement agencies, however, do not follow a unified approach.
The decision to opt for policing rather than a military model leaves open
important choices.

One is whether to focus on intrusive enforcement and

intelligence-gathering methods that promise instrumental gains (at possible cost to
perceived legitimacy), or whether instead to emphasize long-term efforts to build
community trust. Second, where priority is given to the objectives of trust and
cooperation, should those goals be pursued primarily by a “top down” approach
(building ties to community leaders, as recommended in the RAND report), or
should officials emphasize a “bottom up” policy stressing the quality of
interaction with individuals in ordinary street-level encounters?
In Dearborn, Michigan, which has an Arab American community of
200,000, law enforcement has made the maintenance of good police-community
relations a “major concern.”111

In other cities, relations between Muslim-

109

See supra at note -- (discussing commentators who urge the U.S. to make greater use of air power against
the Taliban, even at the risk of extensive civilian casualties).
110

See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL xxv (2007) (noting that “the civilian
population [is] … the deciding factor in the struggle,” with the key issue being the ability to secure their
support).
111
David Thatcher, The Local Role in Homeland Security. 39 L. & SOC. REV. 635, 649 (2005).

34

8/23/2010

35
American Policing

American communities and local police departments are strained.112 At the federal
level, community outreach has not been ignored,113

but policy has been

dominated by measures that relax procedural restraints on investigation and
detention, while expanding substantive criminal offenses to reach behavior with
only tenuous connections to acts of violence.114 From the general public to many
of our highest officials, it is often considered self-evident that tougher measures
will pay greater dividends.115 In Britain, in contrast, those who lead the
counterterrorism effort often stress that success depends on building community
trust by adhering to traditional conceptions of due process.116 In short, no unified
approach to counterterrorism policing has emerged. Instead, officials commonly
emphasize intrusive or coercive tactics without examining their collateral costs, or
focus on generating cooperative relationships with Muslim community leaders
while neglecting the character of daily interactions at the grass roots. A central
issue is to determine which approaches yield the best results in terms of security.
The available empirical evidence offers stark warnings about the
potentially counterproductive effects of harsh measures.

A study of British

counterterrorism policies in Northern Ireland found that of six high-visibility
112

See, e.g., Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD’s Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. TIMES, Nov,
15, 2007, at A1 (describing controversy over Police Department effort to address “radicalization” with aid of
a “community mapping” plan to identify geographic locations of Muslim populations).

113

See Andrea Elliott, White House Quietly Courts Muslims in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at A1.
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Prominent examples include expansion of search and surveillance powers, military detention of alleged
“enemy combatants,” aggressive use of immigration detention and deportation, and enactment of broader
definitions of prohibited “material support” for terrorism. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561
S. Ct. --- (June 21, 2010) (upholding prohibition on giving “material support” by acts intended to encourage
peaceful resolution of grievances). See generally STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN (2002)
(cataloguing post-9/11 measures that expand intelligence gathering and law enforcement powers).
115
See, e.g., former Vice President Dick Cheney, quoted in John F. Harris, Mike Allen & Jim Vandehei,
Feb.
4,
2009,
Cheney
Warns
of
New
Attacks,
POLITICO,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0209/18390.html (accessed on June 9, 2009) (stating that counterterrorism is “a tough, mean, dirty, nasty business . . . . [W]e’re not going to win this fight by turning the other
cheek….The United States needs to be not so much loved as it needs to be respected. Sometimes, that
requires us to take actions that generate controversy.”
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See, e.g., Peter Clarke, The Courts and Terrorism: Transatlantic Observations, Lecture at NYU Law
School, April 15, 2009 (copy on file with the authors) (stating, as former chief of counter-terrorism in
London’s Metropolitan Police, that “[for] deeply pragmatic reasons, . . . it is absolutely essential to adhere to
due process. . . People . . . must have confidence and trust in the authorities. . . . They must believe . . . that
information . . . will not be used . . . to stigmatize their communities or to justify extrajudicial action.”).
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crack-down initiatives, only one had an observable deterrent effect.117 Two others
had no statistically significant impact, while two intrusive policies were
associated with significant increases in violence.118 The researchers hypothesized
that erroneous arrests and the adoption of internment without trial contributed to
this backlash by undermining the legitimacy of anti-terrorism efforts.119 Similarly,
several studies have found that perceived injustice on the part of U.S. forces in
Iraq is a strong predictor of support for resistance there.120
Turning to counterterrorism tactics in the American domestic context,
many thoughtful scholars have suggested that the heightened threat environment
post-9/11 justifies wider use of ethnic profiling121 and other enhanced police
powers, such as greater ability to establish roadblocks and checkpoints.122 Yet we
have already noted the potential negative impact of such policing activities; in the
context of ordinary law enforcement, zero-tolerance measures have often
backfired, encouraging crime and discouraging cooperation by creating
resentment in minority communities.123 A similar problem could well defeat
efforts to augment counterterrorism powers. Indeed, because terrorism is a
relatively dispersed and infrequent phenomenon, posing a threat to a near-infinite
range of symbolic targets and typically using operatives with no prior record of
terrorist activity, accurate and timely information to separate genuine threats from
background noise has enormous value, and community cooperation therefore

117

Gary LaFree, Laura Dugan & Raven Korte, The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political
Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 17, 25-27
(2009).
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Id. at 32-34.
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administered criminal justice procedures, treating captured terrorists as ordinary criminal suspects in an effort
to delegitimate their cause. The detainees responded with a hunger strike to obtain a return to “prisoner-ofwar” status. Further anti-British animosity resulted, and violence subsequently increased. That finding
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E.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413
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assumes even greater than usual importance. To the extent that terrorist groups
seek either to recruit or hide within co-religionist communities, cooperation can
provide information at lower cost and with fewer negative side effects than
coercive or intrusive forms of intelligence gathering.
That said, we cannot assume that findings from ordinary law enforcement
will apply in a straightforward way to counterterrorism policing. Because
terrorism is motivated by ideology rather than desire for material gain, coreligionists or members of the same ethnic community may share some
ideological perspectives with those who plan acts of terror; as a result, lawabiding individuals may be reluctant to put politically radical members of their
communities at risk, even when they themselves oppose violence. In addition,
because al Qaeda invokes religious justifications for its goals and methods, the
religiosity of law-abiding Muslims could conceivably alter the importance of
procedural justice for securing their cooperation. Finally, because links between
procedural justice and willingness to comply or cooperate have not been found in
all societies,124 recent Muslim immigrants who have lived under repressive
governments could conceivably have different notions of legitimacy or its
importance for cooperation.
To test the links between legitimacy, procedural fairness and cooperation
in communities impacted by counterterrorism enforcement, we conducted
extensive interviews and random polling of Muslim-American residents of New
York City.125 We found little evidence that religiosity, cultural differences, or
political background play a significant role in determining willingness to
cooperate, nor does strength of identification with the Muslim community,
disagreement with American government policies on Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel,
or instrumental concerns such as a belief that the police are effective.126

In
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See, e.g., J. Brockner, et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance on
Reactions to Voice, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 300 (2001) (finding that in China people do not react as
strongly as in other cultures to procedural unfairness).
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contrast, as in the case of conventional law enforcement, we found a strong
association between willingness to cooperate with anti-terrorism policing and
perceptions of procedural justice. 127
One way to test the force of these relationships is to look separately at
groups that have particular views about law enforcement or terrorism. For
example, people who consider the terror threat very serious presumably will be
much more willing to cooperate, and their willingness might not be affected so
much by whether they think police actions are intrusive or procedurally irregular.
Likewise people who consider the police effective and people who are inclined to
defer to authority presumably will be willing to cooperate, and again their
willingness might not be affected so much by whether they think police practices
are fair.
To look at those possibilities, we divided our sample into people who
think that the terror threat is serious (or not), people who think the police are
effective (or not), and likewise for the other pairs of attitudes. Table 1 below,
drawn from the New York data, shows these relationships.

[TABLE 1 HERE]
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Table 1
Relationships Within Prior-Attitude Subgroups
Police behavior and perceived procedural justice
as correlated to
Muslim-American willingness to cooperate

Prior Attitudes
Terror is serious
No
Yes
Police are
effective
No
Yes
Police help you
feel safe
No
Yes
Preference for law
enforcement
authority
No
Yes
Respect for
Heirarchy
Low
High

Public/clandestine
police action

Police targeting
of minorities

Procedural justice
of the police

-.26*
-.08

-.21*
-.23*

.37***
.40***

-.18*
-.02

-.12
-.11

.41***
.26**

-.19*
-.07

-.13*
-.10

.36***
.49***

-.20*
-.09

-.20*
-.10

.41***
.29***

-.27***
-.13

-.20*
-.11

.40***
.33***

Entries are subgroup correlations with a combined measure of legitimacy and
cooperation.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Part of what Table 1 shows is not surprising. Among people who think the
terror threat is not serious, willingness to cooperate is reduced substantially by
perceptions that the police use intrusive tactics, target minorities or act unfairly.
We see roughly the same effect in the upper row of the other pairs as well. In
other words, among people who can be considered law enforcement skeptics
(people who prefer liberty to order, don’t accept hierarchies, and think the police
are not effective), cooperation drops substantially when police are perceived as
intrusive or unfair. These are largely the results we would expect, but they
underscore the importance of fairness for cooperation among a substantial
segment of the population.
When we look at the lower row of each pair, those who think terrorism is a
serious problem and generally favor law enforcement authority, we see in column
1 that cooperation isn’t affected by the use of intrusive tactics, and we see in
column 2 that with one exception, cooperation isn’t even affected by targeting.
These people seem more focused on instrumental payoffs than on legitimacy.
They are generally willing to accept intrusive tactics and even targeting of people
in their own community when they accept hierarchical authority and consider the
police effective.
But two relationships are less predictable. First, even when these
respondents consider the terror threat very serious, cooperation drops substantially
if they believe the police are targeting people in their community. And second, in
the lower row of all of these pairs (i.e. even among those who broadly support law
enforcement), the third column shows that cooperation drops substantially, with
very high statistical significance, when police use unfair procedures, such as
stopping people without explanation, denying them any opportunity to be heard,
and failing to treat them with courtesy. In other words, for all of these subgroups,
regardless of prior attitudes about the police, civil liberties, and so on, perceptions
of procedural justice have a major impact on willingness to cooperate.
We can illustrate the concrete impact of these relationships by separating
the respondents into quartiles based on the extent to which they saw the police as
respecting (or not respecting) the requirements of procedural justice. We can then
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focus on willingness to cooperate within each group. By highlighting the
differences between the groups, Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the consequences of
failing to nurture perceptions of procedural fairness.

[TABLES 2 and 3 HERE]
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Table 2
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans
(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in policy creation)

Belief that
Policy is:

n

Created
Fairly
Low

High

Difference

71
69
83
68

percent of each
quartile willing to:

percent of each
quartile willing to:

Work With Police

Alert Police

82%
78%
88%
91%

49%
66%
67%
79%

+9 pts (+ 11%)

+30 pts (+61%)
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Table 3
Willingness to Cooperate Among Muslim-Americans
(Respondents grouped by perceptions of fairness in enforcement)

Belief that
Policy is:

n

Enforced
Fairly
Low

High

Difference

71
69
83
68

percent of each
quartile willing to:

percent of each
quartile willing to:

Work With Police

Alert Police

39%
43%
51%
63%

41%
43%
57%
58%

+24 pts (+ 62%)

+17 pts (+41%)
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These tables show the direct effect of procedural justice on cooperation.
Table 2 focuses on perceived fairness in establishing counterterrorism policies.
When people believe that overall policies are established fairly, willingness to
work with the police rises by 11%, and even more strikingly, willingness to report
suspicious activity rises by 61%. That 61% figure is an increase of enormous
significance for successful intelligence gathering:

Fairness in establishing

policies makes it 61% more likely that people in this community will be willing to
report suspicious behavior.
Table 3 shifts the focus to perceived fairness in enforcement. When people
believe that policies are fairly implemented, willingness to report suspicious
activity increases by 41% and willingness to work with the police increases by
62%.
One somewhat unexpected finding is that willingness to work with police
in anti-terror initiatives is only modestly affected by fairness in the formation of
policy but is extremely sensitive to fairness in enforcement. In contrast,
willingness to alert the police is sensitive to both sorts of fairness, but in the
reverse order: it is much more sensitive to whether overall policies are established
fairly. We suspect that because working with the police is local and personal,
willingness to do so is more strongly driven by the trustworthiness of officials
nearby than by large questions of policy, such as the decision whether maintain a
detention camp at Guantánamo Bay. Conversely, willingness to report suspicious
activity seems more likely to be affected by respondents’ perceptions of overall
systemic fairness: how such information will be processed by higher officials and
how fairly suspects will be treated once they come to law enforcement attention.
If so, it makes sense that willingness to report would be very sensitive to
perceived fairness of the system as a whole but less affected by respondents’ trust
in officials with whom they and their neighbors interact in the neighborhood.
Dynamics of this sort can of course be explored in considerably greater
detail. But the existing research is already ample to establish our two central
points. First, apart from any civil liberties considerations, tough measures that
skirt traditional conceptions of due process take a substantial toll on law
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enforcement effectiveness. And second, procedural justice concerns accordingly
should be allotted a central place in all efforts to design and implement
counterterrorism policy. As in other contexts, sensitivity to procedural justice
serves to promote rather than impair the security effort.

IV. Conclusion
This is an ideal moment to reconsider the principles that guide American
policing. If we give can adopt policing styles that communicate respect and
nurture public trust, we can address the central concerns of both minority and
majority populations.
Research consistently shows that Whites and minorities want the same
thing from the police: fair treatment. Minorities are, however, more apt to say
that historically they have been treated unfairly and that they do not receive fair
treatment even now. This perceived unfairness leads to lower legitimacy ratings,
less deference to the law among minorities and lower levels of cooperation with
the police.
Addressing these concerns involves reframing the way we think about the
goals of policing, in the context of both counterterrorism and ordinary law
enforcement. At all levels, government agencies must pay attention to public
judgments about how they exercise their authority, because such judgments shape
the behaviors that are of primary importance to the police, in particular the
willingness of individuals to obey the law and their willingness to cooperate in
efforts to enforce the law against others.
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